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Principal Place of Business
for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction
Recent federal legislation provides that a corporation is now
a citizen of the state where it has its "principal place of
business." The author of this Note discusses the scope of
this phrase as it will probably be applied by the courts. He
concludes that the purpose of Congress to reduce the num-
ber of diversity cases will be best effectuated if a "most
gross income" test is used as the controlling factor in deter-
mining the "actual place of operations" of a corporation
and, thus, its "principal place of business."
THE diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts extends to
cases and controversies "between citizens of different states .. ." 1
Historically, the term "citizen," as used by the Constitution, did not
include corporations.' However, the federal courts eventually devel-
oped a fiction by which they deemed a corporation, for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, to be a citizen of the state in which it was
incorporated.3 Recently, Congress broadened this concept of cor-
porate citizenship by amending the Judicial Code to provide that a
corporation is "deemed a citizen of any state by which it has been
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. See Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 57, 61 (1809) ("a body
corporate as such cannot be a citizen, within the meaning of the constitution .. ");
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) ("a corpora-
tion . . . is certainly not a citizen; and consequently cannot sue or be sued in the
courts of the United States .. "). The court held in Deveaux, however, that since
all the stockholders of the plaintiff bank had citizenship diverse from that of the
defendant, the suit could be brought in the federal court in the name of the cor-
poration.
8. After the Supreme Court held in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, supra
note 2, that a corporation was not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Judicial
Code of 1789, the Court held in 1844, without reversing Deveaux, that a corporation
was deemed a citizen of the state in which it was incorporated, regardless of the citi-
zenship of its stockholders. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497
(1844). In an effort to harmonize these two decisions, the Court later held that the
stockholders of the corporation were conclusively presumed to be citizens of the
state in which the corporation was incorporated, and therefore, that the corporation
was to be considered a citizen of the state in which it was incorporated. Marshall v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 319 (1854). The cases are reviewed in
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896). For a thorough discussion of this
area, see McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizen-
ship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 56 HAJv. L. REv. 853, 863-83 (1943).
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incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of
business."4
This Note will 1) examine the congressional purpose in adopting
the phrase "principal place of business"; 2) analyze the two tests-
"home office" and "actual place of operations" -which will prob-
ably be used to determine the location of a corporation's principal
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958). (Emphasis added.) Other significant changes are
set out below. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958) now reads:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the
United States, where the plaintiff is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover
less than the sum or value of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff
or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and
exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff
and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958) now reads:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof are additional parties.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute
of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the
Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum
or value of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to
which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest
and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition,
may impose costs on the plaintiff.
28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1958) was added:
(c) A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation
law of such state may not be removed to any district court of the United States.
Because a corporation is now a citizen of both the state of its incorporation and
the state where it has its principal place of business, many corporations are likely
to have two citizenships. Under the law prior to the amendment, a similar situation
arose when the corporation was incorporated in more than one state. These multi-
state corporations were treated, however, as citizens only of the state in which the
suit was brought, if they were incorporated in that state. See, e.g., Jacobson v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1952), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 909
(1953). Thus, if a business incorporated in states A and B were sued in state A by a
citizen of state A, no diversity existed since the corporation was deemed to be a
citizen of state A - the state in which the suit was brought. See id. However, if the
corporation was sued in state A by a citizen of state B, there was diversity, even
though the corporation was also incorporated in state B. See, e.g., Railway Co. v.
Whitton's Adin'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871). However, if the suit were brought
by a citizen of either state A or B in a third state, C, diversity did not exist.
In such a case the courts applied the doctrine of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 1 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806), which required complete diversity-that the citizenship of all
the plaintiffs had to be diverse from that of all the defendants. See Waller v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 127 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Thompson, 8 F.R.D. 96 (E.D. Mo. 1948). In two cases decided since the amendment,
district courts have refused to apply the "state of suit" rule to multistate corporations
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place of business; and 3) consider which is the more satisfactory
test, consistent with the congressional purpose and the practical
needs of litigants.
I. CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE
The primary purpose of Congress in broadening the concept of
corporate citizenship was to reduce the workload in the federal
district courts.5 Since 1941, the number of private civil cases
in the situation where a corporation has a dual citizenship because it is incorporated
in one state and has a principal place of business in another. Instead, the respective
courts used the doctrine of Strawbridge to declare that in any case where a citizen
of one of the states in which the corporation is deemed a citizen sues, or is sued by,
the corporation, diversity does not exist. Harker v. Kopp, 172 F. Supp. 180 (W.D.
M11. 1959); Jaconski v. McCloskey, 167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1958). Jaconski is
discussed in 27 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 592 (1959); 4 ViLL. L. REv. 451 (1959). For
a full treatment of this subject see Comment, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 1287, 1294-99
(1958).
For other recent comments on the amendment, see Cowen, Federal Jurisdiction
Amended, 55 VA. L. REv. 971 (1958); Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal
Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1959); Note, 46 CA=I. L. REV. 831 (1958);
Note, 8 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 361 (1959); Note, 33 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 179 (1958);
Comment, 58 CoLum. L. REV. 1287 (1958); Comment, 72 HAv. L. REv. 451 (1958);
Comment, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 637 (1958); Comment, 33 TuL. L. REV. 167 (1958);
Comment, 13 U. ML4i-N L. REv. 63 (1958).
5. See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
1958 S. REP.]; Hearings Before Subcomm. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5 at IH, 2-3 (1957) [here-
inafter cited as 1957 Hearings]; 104 CONG. REc. 11502-09 (daily ed. June 30, 1958).
According to Congress, the increase in the amount-in-controversy requirement
would result in a 38.2 % decrease in the number of contract cases, and an estimated
10% in the tort cases. See 1958 S. REP. 5. The anticipated decrease in diversity cases
affected by the change in corporate citizenship in various districts ranged from 3.6%
to 23.5%. See id. at 14.
DmEcToa OF THE ADMINISTRATrVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES QUARTERLY
REP. 12 (Nov. 15, 1958), cited in Comment, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, n.2 (1958),
shows that the amendment resulted in a decline of 25% in the cases which were
expected to have been filed in the federal district courts on the basis of prior figures.
Total diversity cases declined approximately 17% during August and September of
1958 over the same months in 1957. This decline consisted primarily of a 57%
decline in insurance cases, and a 37% decline in contract cases, a 17% decline in
personal injury (motor vehicle) cases and a 25% decline in personal injury (non-
motor vehicle) cases.
The provision for costs in § 1331(b) and § 1332(b) was inserted to make the
$10,000 limitation a forceful one and to prevent inflated claims. 1958 S. REP. 5. But
note the difference in language of the sections. Section 1332(b) applies only to the
"Plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts. ... while § 1331(b)
does not contain a similar restriction, and thus could be applied in the case where
the defendant removes the case to the federal court. There is some evidence that
this was merely a legislative oversight. See Comment, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 1287,
1291, n.31 (1958); Comment, 72 H.'.nv. L. REv. 391, 392 (1958).
The provision forbidding the removal of suits based on state workmen's compensa-
tion statutes was inserted because:
The removal of workmen's compensation cases from the State courts to the
Federal courts adds to the already overburdened docket of the Federal courts,
the congestion in some of which is now most deplorable. . . . When [these
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filed in the federal district courts has increased 75 per cent.6 How-
ever, the number of cases based on diversity of citizenship has in-
creased 290 per cent in the same period.7 Approximately 60 per cent
of all diversity cases involved corporations.' By enlarging the scope
of corporate citizenship Congress attempted to close the federal
judicial doors, in some situations, to the parties who were most often
involved in diversity litigation.9
The heavy influx of diversity cases involving corporations stemmed
from the fact that, prior to the amendment, a corporation was
deemed a citizen only of the state in which it was incorporated."°
Because a corporation often does not incorporate in a state for the
purpose of doing business there-but rather for reasons such as
convenience," more advantageous tax laws, 2 or more liberal corpora-
tion statutes '3-suits involving the corporation are not as likely to
cases are] removed to the Federal court the venue provisions of State statute[s]
cannot be applied. Very often cases removed to the Federal courts require the
workman to travel long distances and to bring his witnesses at great expense.
This places an undue burden upon the workman and very often the workman
settles his claim because he cannot afford the luxury of trial in Federal court.
1958 S. REP. 8-9.
6. See 1958 S. Rii:. 3.
7. Ibid. Diversity suits increased from 7,286 in 1941 to 20,524 in 1956.
8. "Of the 20,524 diversity of citizenship cases filed in the district courts during
...1956, corporations were parties in 12,732, or 62 per cent." Ibid.
9. However, Congress did not intend to exclude corporations from diversity
jurisdiction altogether. See 1958 S. BEP. 18. See also id. at 3, 5; 1957 Hearings 14.
The following table appears in 1958 S. REP. 13:
Diversity cases involving a non-
resident corporation doing
Total diver- business in the state
sity cases I Percentage of di-
Fiscal Year commenced Total cases versity cases
1950 ............... .. 13,124 7,520 57.3
1951 ............... 13,474 7,999 59.4
1955 ............... 19,121 11,054 57.8
1956 ............... 20,524 11,881 57.9
When this table is compared to the material cited note 8 supra, it appears that
of the 12,732 cases in which a corporation was a party in 1956, 11,881 of them
involved a nonresident corporation doing business in that state.
10. See generally 1958 S. REP. 20-21. Cf. McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction:
Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 56 Hanv.
L. REv. 1090, 1103-11 (1943).
11. For example, the incorporators of a corporation may find it more convenient
to incorporate in the state in which they reside, even though they intend that the
corporation conduct all its business in another state.
12. See 1958 S. REP. 4.
13. For example, Delaware has liberal corporation statutes. Congress believed this
fact to be a "matter of common knowledge." Ibid. See generally CORPORATION TRuST
Co., WHY CoRPoRATioNs LmVE Ho?.m (1929).
In a hearing before the House Committee of the Judiciary in 1932 on a proposal
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arise in the state of incorporation as they are in the state or states
where the corporation has contact with the public.14 The practical
result under the prior rule very often was that a corporation and a
citizen of the state in which the corporation conducted its business
were treated as citizens of different states.15 Thus, the corporation
was able to invoke diversity jurisdiction in all cases except when suit
was brought against it in the state where it was incorporated, 6 or
when it sued, or was sued by, a citizen of the state of its incor-
poration.1
A secondary reason for adopting the amendment was to obviate
the unfairness caused by the situation where a corporation with a
foreign charter was able to invoke diversity while a similar corpora-
tion with a local charter, or an individual citizen, was denied an
equal opportunity to gain access to the federal courts. 8
which declared corporations to be citizens of any state in which they did business,
a pamphlet issued by a corporation engaged in the business of reincorporating other
corporations was cited which listed diversity as an advantage of foreign incorporation.
See Hearings on Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 10,594 and H. R. 11,508, 72 Cong., 1st Sess.
101 (1932).
14. This Note takes the position that the number of suits involving the corpora-
tion varies with the amount of contact the corporation has with the public in a
given state. It is in the state where the corporation has its most employees and
agents that torts are likely to be committed. It is in the state where the physical assets
of the corporation are concentrated that physical defects in the plant and equipment
will result in injuries to third persons. It is in the states where the corporation pur-
chases its raw materials and sells its finished product that opportunities for contract
and warranty actions will arise.
15. For example, a Delaware corporation could invoke diversity jurisdiction in
every case except when the suit was brought in Delaware, or when it was sued by
a citizen of Delaware. See notes 16-17 infra.
16. When sued in a court of the state in which it is incorporated, the corporation
cannot remove the case to the federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958), which
provides in part:
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.
Thus a corporation cannot invoke diversity when it is sued in the state in which
it is incorporated, even though the plaintiff is not a citizen of that state. However,
a corporation can bring the suit in the federal court in the state where it is incorpo-
rated if the defendant is a citizen of a different state.
17. Of course, no diversity exists when the suit is between the corporation and a
citizen of the state in which the corporation is incorporated, no matter where the
suit is brought.
18. See 1958 S. REP. 4, where it is said:
This fiction of stamping a corporation a citizen of the State of its incorporation
has given rise to the evil whereby a local institution, engaged in a local business
and in many cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its litigation into the
Federal courts simply because it has obtained a corporate charter from another
State. . . . This circumstance can be hardly considered fair because it gives the
privilege of a choice of courts to a local corporation simply because it has a
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Congress aimed the phrase "principal place of business" primarily
at the smaller corporation, whose business was centered in one
state, but which was incorporated in another state.19 The purpose
of directing the phrase at these local corporations with foreign char-
ters was two-fold. First, a substantial reduction in the number of
cases based on diversity could be achieved.20 Second, their advan-
tage of superior access to the federal courts would be eliminated.2
These results could be accomplished without the danger of subject-
ing these corporations to the proverbial prejudice of local courts and
juries exhibited toward citizens of other states -which diversity
was historically designed to prevent22 - since local corporations
charter from another state, an advantage which another local corporation that
obtained its charter in the home State does not have....
It appears neither fair nor proper for such a corporation to avoid trial in the
State where it has its principal place of business by resorting to a legal device
not available to the individual citizen.
Also, see id. at 17-21; 1957 Hearings 11-14.
Most writers on the subject have declared that there may be definite advantages
in litigating in the federal courts. These are usually listed as 1) to obtain a court
differently constituted than the state court; 2) federal judges are appointed and have
life tenure, which differs from the practices in many states; 3) the federal courts
require a unanimous verdict; 4) a federal jury is drawn in a different manner than
a state court jury; 5) federal jurisdiction permits a suit in a court where distance
may be a disadvantage to the other party. See, e.g., Warren, Corporations and
Diversity Jurisdiction, 19 VA. L. REv. 661, 687 (1933); 1958 S. REP'. 18-21.
Before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it was often possible for a
corporation to obtain a result different than under applicable state law by removing
the case to the federal court or by invoking federal jurisdiction initially. For the
most flagrant example of this, see Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). See also Irvine Co. v. Bond,
74 Fed. 849 (S.D. Cal. 1896). See generally Howlett, Creating a Diversity of Citi-
zenship to Obtain Federal Jurisdiction, 1 RocKY MT. L. REv. 108 (1928). Thus, not
only was it desirable to invoke federal jurisdiction from a procedural standpoint-
substantive results sometimes depended upon the existence of diversity.
19. See 1958 S. RLEP. 3-5; 104 CONG. REc. 11507 (daily ed. June 30, 1958). Cf., lan-
guage quoted note 18 supra. Such a corporation is referred to in this Note as a
"local corporation with a foreign charter."
20. Since it was difficult to collect statistics of the location of a corporation's
principal place of business, no very indicative figures were available. Nonetheless,
from the information Congress had on hand, they believed "that a small but sub-
stantial number of cases will be affected." 1958 S. REP. 14. The information con-
sisted of surveys taken by clerks of five district courts, and showed that the percent-
age of decrease varied from 3.6% in the southern district of Texas to 23.5% in the
western district of Michigan. Ibid.
See note 5 supra for more recent indications of the effectiveness of the amendment.
21. Ibid. Since the amendment is designed to treat a local corporation with a
foreign charter as a citizen in the state where it conducts its business, its access to
the federal courts will be the same as if it received a charter from that state.
22. See 1958 S. REP. 4, where the Senate Committee states:
The underlying purpose of diversity of citizenship legislation (which inci-
dentally goes back to the beginning of the Federal judicial system, having been
established by the Judiciary Act of 1789) is to provide a separate forum for
out-of-State citizens against the prejudice of local courts and local juries by
making available to them the benefits and safeguards of the Federal courts.
Whatever the effectiveness of this rule, it was never intended to extend to
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with foreign charters are not likely to be treated any differently from
local corporations with local charters.23
Congress believed, however, that while local corporations with
foreign charters were not open to local prejudice, nationwide corpo-
rations were subject to such prejudice, and to deny these corpora-
tions access to the federal courts would work a hardship upon them.24
Thus, the phrase was not intended to "eliminate from diversity ...
those corporations which do business over a large number of states,
such as railroads and insurance companies whose businesses are not
localized in one -particular state."25 However, Congress did intend
that even these corporations are to be deprived of diversity in the
one state where they carry on their principal business.26
Although Congress had been considering the problem of corpora-
local corporations which, because of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of
another State.
See, e.g., Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. lE v. 356, 357
(1933); Howlett, Creating a Diversity of Citizenship to Obtain Federal Jurisdiction,
1 RocxY MT. L. Rlxv. 108, 109-10 (1928); Steinberg, Diversity Jurisdiction, 10 No-mE
DAIm LAw. 219, 221-23 (1935). But see Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power
Between United States and State Courts, 13 CoRaELL L.Q. 499, 520-30 (1928);
Friendly, The Historic Bases of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 H.Av. L. REV. 483, 487-
99 (1928).
23. See 1958 S. REP. 4. But see Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction,
28 ILL. L. REv. 356, 360 (1933).
When the ordinary man who does business with a corporation rarely knows
where it is formed, can one maintain seriously that there is prejudice against
the corporation in every state except that one whose law gave it being?
Ibid. Ball then goes on to show that the prejudice against a corporation, if any, is
economic in nature, rather than geographic. See id. at 361.
24. 1958 S. REPs. 18. See 1957 Hearings 11-14. In reply to the proposal that di-
versity should be abolished altogether, the Judicial Conference formulated the fol-
lowing argument which answers Ball's attack on diversity:
It has been argued by those who would abolish the Federal diversity jurisdiction
that in our modem highly integrated society there no longer exists the prejudice
of the courts of one state against the parties who are citizens of other States,
which was one of the basic reasons for the establishment of the diversity juris-
diction when the Federal courts were first created. Although from the nature of
the problem, there can be no objective evidence as to the truth of this assertion,
there is a great bulk of expert opinion from those who litigate in the courts
that local prejudice continues to exist, and that the Federal courts are in truth
a strong protection against it.
1958 S. RaP. 18.
The "great bulk of expert opinion" referred to probably came from the Congressional
hearings held in 1932 and 1933 on a bill which declared a corporation to be a
citizen of every state in which it did business. See S. BEP. No. 530, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932); Hearings on Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Before
the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 10,594 and H.R. 11,508, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 12 (1932); Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee of the
Committee of the Judiciary on S. 987 andS. 989, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
25. See 1958 S. REP. 5.
26. "Even ... [those corporations which do business over a large area] would
be regarded as a citizen of that one of the States in which was located its principal
place of business." Ibid.
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tions and diversity for many years,27 no acceptable proposal had
been presented until the Judicial Conference 28 suggested the phrase
"principal place of business" as a means of limiting the use by cor-
porations of diversity jurisdiction. Initially, the Judicial Conference
proposed that a corporation should be declared a citizen of the state• e29
from which it derived fifty per cent of its gross income. This
proposal, if adopted, would have succeeded in excluding only local
corporations with foreign charters from diversity jurisdiction. The
proposal would not have excluded a large nationwide corporation;
it is doubtful whether such a corporation would do fifty per cent of
its business in any one state. However, the phrase "principal place
of business" was intended to exclude such a corporation in one
state.30 The Judicial Conference rejected the fifty per cent require-
ment in 1952 in favor of the phrase "principal place of business"
because
this provides a simpler and more practical formula than our original sug-
gestions which would have foreclosed the jurisdiction in States where more
than half of the corporate gross income is received. Our present proposal
to rest the matter upon the principal place of business of the corporation
has precedent in the jurisdiction provisions of the Bankruptcy Act . ..
and so provides a more familiar criteria, while at the same time preserving
the purpose of our previous recommendations to prevent frauds and abuses
of the Federal jurisdiction by corporations which are primarily local in
character.3 1
Congress adopted the proposal of the Judicial Conference, empha-
sizing the availability of precedents which had interpreted the
phrase "principal place of business" in the context of the Bankruptcy
27. For example, in 1932, a bill making a corporation a citizen of every state in
which it did business was proposed and rejected. See Comment, 31 Mici. L. B-v.
54 (1932); 1957 Hearings 10-11, where twenty-four such bills are listed.
The Committee of Jurisdiction and Venue has been considering the problem since
1951. See 1958 S. REP. 15--21.
28. The Judicial Conference is a council of judges called by the Chief Justice of
the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1958). The Conferences Committee
of Jurisdiction and Venue was largely responsible for suggesting the changes made
by the amendment.
29. The proposal, dated March 12, 1951, provided:
For the purpose of this section and of section 1441 of this title a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated. For
these purposes it shall also be deemed a citizen of a State from business trans-
acted within which it derived more than half of its gross income during the
fiscal year last preceding the commencement of the action, if it is brought
under this section, or preceding the filing of the petition for removal under
section 1446.
1958 S. Rn'. 26.
80. See note 26 supra.
31. 1958 S. REP. 31. This action was taken in September of 1951 upon a sugges-
tion of the judges of the Tenth Circuit, and the Committee of Jurisdiction and
Venue amended its initial recommendations to read as the amendment currently
reads. See id. at 30-31.
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Act.32 Since Congress apparently believed that the cases decided
under the Bankruptcy Act would furnish adequate tests for deter-
ining a corporation's principal place of business, a careful examina-
tion of these tests is necessary.
II. TESTS FOR DETERMI-ING A ComRoATON'S PRINCIPAL
PLACE OF BusINEss
Under section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, a corporation may be
adjudicated a bankrupt in the district where its "principal place of
business" was located for the preceding six months.3 For purposes
of the Bankruptcy Act, the courts have used two tests to determine
where the principal place of business of the corporation is located.
Some courts hold that the principal place of business is where the
"home office" is established,3 4 while others hold that it is the location
of the "actual place of operations." 
35
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE TEsTs
Home office test
In determining the location of a corporation's home office, the
factors considered as significant are the location of the managing
offices,36 the place where the stockholders live or regularly meet,37
the place from which the financial affairs of the corporation are
centered or controlled,38 and the location of the record, stock, or
minute books of the corporation." The courts have not considered
as significant the amount or nature of the business which the com-
pany does in a particular state.4"
32. The proposal to rest the test of jurisdiction upon the 'principal place of
business' of a corporation has ample precedent in the decisions of our courts
and in Federal statute[s] such as the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act ...
There is thus provided sufficient criteria to guide courts in future litigation under
the bill.
1958 S. REP. 5.
33. 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1958).
34. See, e.g., Shearin v. Cortz Oil Co., 92 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1937); Burdict v.
Dillon, 144 Fed. 737 (1st Cir. 1906); In re Portex Oil Co., 30 F. Supp. 138 (D.
Ore. 1939); In re R. H. Pennington & Co., 228 Fed. 388 (W.D. Ky. 1915).
35. See, e.g., Dryden v. Ranger Refining & Pipe Line Co., 280 Fed. 257 (5th
Cir. 1922); Continental Coal Corp. v. Rozelle Bros., 242 Fed. 243 (6th Cir. 1917);
Home Powder Co. v. Geis, 204 Fed. 568 (8th Cir. 1913); In re Tygarts River Coal
Co., 203 Fed. 178 (N.D.W.Va. 1913).
36. See, e.g., Shearin v. Cortz Oil Co., 92 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1937) (main office
where the offcers worked and the directors met held to be corporation's principal
place of business).
37. See 1 COLLiER, BANKRUPTCY § 2.19(2) (14th ed. 1956).
38. See Burdict v. Dillon, 144 Fed. 737 (1st Cir. 1906); In re Portex Oil Co.,
30 F. Supp. 138 (D. Ore. 1939).
39. See Shearin v. Cortz Oil Co., 92 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1937); 1 CoLmai
BANKRUPTCY § 2.19(1) (14th ed. 1956).
40. See cases cited note 34 supra.
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The home office must be more than the mere nominal office some-
times required by the laws of the incorporating state; 41 it must be
the place from which the direction and destiny of the business enter-
prise are controlled 42 For example, in Burdict v. Dillon 4 3 the corpora-
tion was in the business of quarrying slate. It had quarries and a
slate mill in New York and Vermont but "supreme direction and
control" were exercised from an office located in Boston,44 where the
officers and directors lived and met, and where the great bulk of the
sales were transacted. The court held that the principal place of
business of the corporation was in Massachusetts and not in one of
the other two states where the actual quarrying and milling opera-
tions were conducted.
Actual place of operations
The courts which use the test of actual place of operations empha-
size the location of the mines, factories, or other production facilities
or activities of the corporation.45 In Dryden v. Ranger Refining &
Pipe Line Co.,4 the bankrupt was a Delaware corporation engaged
in the business of producing, transporting and selling crude oil. The
managing offices of the corporation, along with some of the oil wells
and other physical assets of the company were located in Kansas
City, Missouri. The court held that the principal place of business
of the corporation was not in Missouri, but rather in Texas, because
the property owned by the corporation in Texas was worth five times
as much as that located in Missouri; the production of gas and oil
was ten times as great, and the gross revenue was four-and-one-half
times as large. In In re Tygarts River Coal Co.4 7 the home office
41. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 300.025(1) (1957); Tiffany v. La Plume Condensed
Milk Co., 141 Fed. 444 (M.D. Pa. 1905).
42. See Burdict v. Dillon, 144 Fed. 737 (Ist Cir. 1906); Lawrence v. Atlantic
& Pulp Corp., 298 Fed. 246 (5th Cir. 1924). In the Lawrence case, the corpora-
tion was incorporated under the laws of New York, and there maintained an office
used by the executive committee that supervised the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion. The company's main office was in Georgia, where it conducted all its business
and where the books of the corporation were located. The court held that the
principal place of business of the corporation was in Georgia.
43. 144 Fed. 737 (Ist Cir. 1906).
44. Id. at 738.
45. See cases cited note 85 supra, and In re Flexton Corp., 206 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.
1953). In this case the corporation was engaged in the manufacture of its product
in Pennsylvania where its plant was located, and where the main office of the corpo-
ration was established. However, the company maintained a small sales office in
New York, where most of the sales were consummated. Although it might have
been argued that the principal activity of the corporation was selling, and that thus
the principal place of business of the corporation was in New York, the court
affirmed the district court's finding that the principal place of business of the
corporation was in Pennsylvania.
46. 280 Fed. 257 (5th Cir. 1922).
47. 208 Fed. 178 (N.D.W.Va. 1913).
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of the corporation was in Philadelphia. Its principal asset was a coal
mine in West Virginia. The court held that the corporation's princi-
pal place of business was in West Virginia stating that the managing
office was merely "incidental to and dependent on the . . . mining
operation . , 48
In the bankruptcy cases where the corporation had carried on
more than one activity in more than one state,40 the courts inserted
a preliminary step before they applied the test of actual place of
operations. The court first determined which of the activities of the
corporation was its primary one, and then determined where that
primary activity was located. 50 For example, in In re DeSoto Crude
Oil Co.,"' the corporation was engaged in the business of operating
a pipeline in Texas and selling oil in Louisiana. The court concluded
that the primary business of the corporation was selling oil, not
operating a pipeline. Since the business of selling oil was concen-
trated in Louisiana, the actual place of operations was held to be
in that state. 2
B. ANALYSIS OF THE TESTS
Home office test
The home office test will effectively exclude most local corpora-
tions with foreign charters from diversity jurisdiction. This is so
because the home office of such a corporation is likely to be located
in the same state as where it has its primary contacts with the
public 1 3 -the state where most suits involving the corporation are
48. Id. at 180. The court recognized however, that "some of the federal courts
have construed this phrase 'principal place of business' to be the place where its
chief officers reside and maintain an office. Ibid.
49. See notes 51-52 infra.
50. A similar approach was sometimes used by a court which was deciding
whether to adopt the home office test or the actual place of operations test. See In re
Tygarts River Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178, 180 (N.D.W.Va. 1913).
51. 35 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1940).
52. A similar case was Matter of Devonian Spring Co., 272 Fed. 527 (N.D. Ohio
1920). In this case the bankrupt was incorporated in Ohio and the charter named
an Ohio city as its principal place of business. The business of the corporation was
the welling and bottling of artesian well water, and was centered in Ohio. However,
an officer of the corporation sold the water primarily in Kentucky. The court treated
the activity of selling as separate from the welling and bottling operation, and held
that the primary activity of the corporation was bottling water. Selling was merely
incidental. Since the business of bottling was located in Ohio, the principal place of
business of the corporation was in that state. This case has been cited as adopting
the home office test. See 1 CoLLtR, BANKRUPTCY § 2.19(2) n.8 (14th ed. 1956).
The recital of the location of the corporation's principal place of business in the
charter is not controlling, although it places the burden of proof on the challenger
to show that the principal place of business is in a state other than that which
is recited in the charter. See id.
53. A local corporation which conducts most of its business in one state would
have little reason for conducting that business from a foreign home office far removed
from the business activities of the corporation.
likely to arise.54 For example, a large department store located in
Minnesota might be incorporated in Delaware, but it would do most
of its business in Minnesota. If the corporation were deemed a citi-
zen of Minnesota, because its home office was located there, the
purpose of Congress would be accomplished since the corporation
would be effectively excluded from diversity jurisdiction,55 thereby
reducing to some extent the number of cases in the federal courts.
In most cases it would be as easy to determine the location of the
home office of a large nationwide corporation, such as a large railroad
or an insurance company, as it would be to determine the home
office of a local corporation. However, if the home office test is used
to determine the principal place of business of a nationwide corpora-
tion, it is unlikely that the number of diversity cases will be
decreased to the extent hoped for by Congress. There is not neces-
sarily a relationship between the location of the home office of such
a corporation and the place where the most suits are likely to arise. 6
For example, suppose that an insurance company which sells crop
insurance has its home office in Ohio. Most suits involving the
corporation are likely to arise in the agricultural states of the Mid-
west. Hence, to apply the home office test to such a corporation
would not serve to substantially decrease the opportunities of such
a corporation to invoke diversity jurisdiction. 7
The application of the home office test to a nationwide corpora-
tion is even less satisfactory when, because of the corporation's
management structure, the location of the corporation's home office
cannot be ascertained with certainty. For example, suppose that a
corporation, which is engaged in the general activity of processing
grain, has separate divisions located in different states which manu-
facture flour, breakfast cereal, and livestock feed. The activities of
the separate divisions are not coordinated from any readily identifi-
able home office.58 If the home office test were applied, the managing
54. See note 14 supra.
55. See 1958 S. Ra'E. 4-5.-
56. In In re Tygarts River Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178, 180 (N.D.W.Va. 1913) the
court argued, in rejecting the home office test, that "all [creditors] . . . would have
to go to Philadelphia (it could as well be to San Francisco) to have their claims
and liens adjudicated, solely because the officers of the corporation saw fit for their
convenience to establish an office in such distant city, and call it their company s
principal place of business." Also, see In re Portex Oil Co., 30 F. Supp. 188 (D.
Ore. 1939) where the court described the purpose of the Bankruptcy provision as
"allowing the internal administration of a company to be settled at the point where
those interested in it chose primarily to conduct its business." Id. at 140.
57. If the corporation was considered a citizen of Ohio, it could invoke diversity
in every other state, except when it was sued by, or brought suit against, a citizen
of Ohio. See notes 15-17 supra.
58. Although it is likely that the internal affairs of the corporation are controlled
from a central office where the Board of Directors or executive committee meets,
the cases under the Bankruptcy Act would probably locate the home office of the
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office of the most important activity would probably be selected as
the home office.59 However, it might be difficult to prove initially
the location of the most important activity of the corporation, and
even if this could be established, there is no certainty that the state
where the selected office is located will be the place where the
corporation has its primary contacts with the public.
Actual place of operations test
The actual place of operations test, like the home office test, would
effectively prevent the invoking of diversity jurisdiction by the local
corporation with a foreign charter, since the place of actual opera-
tions is where such a corporation has its primary contacts with the
public. Moreover, the actual place of operations test would effec-
tively accomplish the congressional purpose even though the home
office of a local corporation happened to be in another state; the
actual place of operations of a corporation has a direct relation to
the state where the most suits involving the corporation are likely
to arise.
The actual place of operations test, like the home office test, would
exclude a large nationwide corporation from diversity in one state.6 0
However, unlike the home office test, the actual place of operations
test would most likely exclude such a corporation from diversity in
the state where most suits involving it would probably arise, since
it would eliminate the corporation from the state where it has its
• " 61
primary contacts with the public.
It would appear therefore, that the test of actual place of opera-
tions is the more satisfactory one for determining a corporation's
principal place of business, since it will result in the greatest reduc-
tion in the number of diversity suits. However, there is a serious
drawback to applying the test to large nationwide corporations
because it may discourage some litigants from justifiably resorting
to the federal courts. By amending the Judicial Code to provide that
a corporation is a citizen of its principal place of business, Congress
did not intend to discourage litigants from invoking diversity in
any case where the citizenship of the parties is actually diverse 612
under the standards set out by Congress. But, the actual place of
operations test may have such an effect because of the problems
involved in proving that diversity exists.
corporation in the state where the actual business affairs of the corporation are
controlled. See Lawrence v. Atlantic & Pulp Corp., 298 Fed. 246 (5th Cir. 1924)
discussed in note 42 supra.
59. See id. Cf. In re R.H. Pennington & Co., 228 Fed. 888 (W.D. Ky. 1915).
60. See text accompanying notes 53 & 54 supra.
61. See text accompanying notes 55 & 56 supra.
62. See 1958 S. RFP. 8, 4, 17-21.
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The party who asserts that federal jurisdiction exists has the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion.6 3 The mere alle-
gation in the complaint or in the petition for removal that diversity
exists is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court initially.64 How-
ever, if this allegation is challenged by a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction,65 the asserting party must convince
the court of the existence of diversity. Even if the allegation is not
challenged, the court may, on its own motion, dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction at any stage in the proceedings 66 if the record does not
show that diversity exists.67 Prior to the amendment, even though
the allegation of the corporation's citizenship was challenged, the
fact issue was easily resolved because it only entailed a determina-
tion of where the corporation was incorporated.68 However, if the
actual place of operations test is used, the fact issue that is presented
if the allegation of jurisdiction is challenged is not so easily resolved.
It would entail the proving of several factors, each of which requires
the accumulation of a substantial amount of evidence.69
63. See, e.g., Thomson v. Gaskill, 815 U.S. 442 (1942) (diversity); McNutt v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) (amount in controversy).
Although the above cases did not distinguish between the burden of first produc-
tion and the ultimate burden of persuasion, it is likely that the asserting party has
both. Since the mere allegation in the complaint that diversity exists is enough to
confer jurisdiction on the court, a party has probably met the burden of first
production by alleging in the complaint that diversity exists. See note 64 infra.
For a general discussion of the burden of production and the burden of persuasion
see McComianic, EVDENCE § 306-07 (1954).
64. See, e.g., Gordon v. Third Natl Bank, 144 U.S. 97 (1892).
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), which provides in part: "the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion; (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. .
66. See Fm). R. Civ. P. 12(h), which provides in part: "whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."
The action may be dismissed even at the appellate court level. The most obvious
case where this occurred was in McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298
U.S. 127 (1936), where the issue of jurisdiction had never been considered by the
seven lower courts which heard the case. The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on their own motion.
67. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
68. FED. R. Civ. P., Form 2 provides as a sample allegation of jurisdiction the
following: "Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Connecticut and defendant is a
corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New York."
FaD. R. Civ. P. 84 provides: "The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are
sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity
of statement which the rules contemplate."
When an allegation such as the one set out above was challenged, a certified copy
of the corporation's charter would suffice to end the controversy.
It is likely that under the amendment, the complaint should now include an allega-
tion of the corporation's principal place of business.
69. See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra. Also, since the federal courts are
not bound by decisions in other circuits, and since the principle of res judicata would
not be applicable, a corporation or its opponent may be able to claim that the
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For example, suppose the court considered a controlling factor in
determining a corporation's actual place of operations to be the
value of the physical assets of the corporation. First, the party will
have to determine the various locations of the assets, which may be
widely scattered throughout the country. Second, he must have
satisfactory evidence to establish their value.70 If the nationwide
corporation is the asserting party it would probably have most of
the relevant information available from its business records. How-
ever, the problem faced by the corporation's adversary would be
much more difficult. None of this information would be readily
available to the adversary because the only source of such informa-
tion is likely to be the corporation itself.71 If the corporation refuses
to furnish the information voluntarily, the only practical alternative
is resort to the federal discovery procedures." But discovery is not
entirely satisfactory."3 The information sought is likely to be lengthy
and complex, and would not add anything to the substantive cause
of action. Hence, its utility might not be commensurate with the
cost of discovering it.74 Therefore, the party would have to weigh
the difficulty and expense of proving the existence of diversity against
the advantages to be gained from entering the federal courts.
location of the corporation's principal place of business is elsewhere than established
in a prior suit. Thus, it might be possible for a corporation to invoke diversity in a
state in one case, while in another case, brought in the same state, the court could
deny jurisdiction to the corporation. One solution to this problem might be to shift
the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion to the
party who objects to the location of a corporation's principal place of business which
has been established in prior litigation involving the corporation.
70. There is no indication in the cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act what
the proper measure of the value of the physical assets should be.
71. The books of a corporation are generally not open to the public, unless, of
course, the adversary is a stockholder of the corporation. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §
301.84(2) (5) (1957), which provides that "every shareholder ...shall have the
right to examine .. . the . .. books of account .. .and to make extracts there-
from."
72. See FED. R. Cry. P. 26(a) which provides that "any party may take the
testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or
written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the
action or for both purposes." FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (production and inspection of books,
etc.).
Rule 26(b) provides for the scope of discovery, and states that any party may
be "examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action .... "
73. See 4 MooRE, FaEDRA. P RA cE ir 26.38 (2d ed. 1948) for a discussion of
the discovery problem involved in the "big" case. See also Comment, Tactical Use
and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YA.E L.J. 117, 126-34 (1949).
Cf., McInerney, Discovery -Success or Failure, 24 INs. CousarE J. 115 (1957).
74. The taxation of the expenses of taking depositions as costs is a matter within
the court's discretion under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). See Harris v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 139 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1939). In practice, however, the party will
probably not be fully compensated for the time and expense which discovery
actually costs him.
Moreover, when a party attempts to enter the federal courts on
the grounds of diversity, his opponent, as a dilatory tactic, may chal-
lenge the allegation. Whether or not the challenge is well-founded, it
will necessarily take time to hear and decide the jurisdictional issue.
Because of the substantial amount of information necessary to prove
that diversity exists, considerable delay may ensue. This delay may
serve only to harass the plaintiff, or it may harm his substantive
cause of action if time is vital to the issues involved.
Also, a defendant may use the threat of challenging the allegation
of jurisdiction as an effective bargaining weapon completely apart
from the merits of the action. When the plaintiff is confronted with
this difficult factual issue at the onset of the lawsuit, his bargaining
position is less advantageous than it would otherwise be since he
would have to expend considerable time and money to avoid a dis-
missal on jurisdictional grounds.
The requirement of proving the existence of diversity is likely to
create an unfair advantage, favoring the corporate over the non-
corporate litigant. The noncorporate litigant must expend time and
money to secure the necessary proof. The corporation need not do
this, since it has the necessary information readily available. Also,
the corporation is more likely to be able to bear any expense and
inconvenience involved in proving the issue. The practical result is
that, even though diversity may actually exist, a noncorporate liti-
gant will be deterred from invoking federal jurisdiction while the
corporation will be able to enter the federal court if it wishes.
However, in any case where the burden of proof presents a genu-
ine problem the unfairness occasioned by the necessity of proving
the existence of diversity can be avoided. This can be done by
adopting as the controlling factor in the actual place of operations
test the determination of the state from which the corporation
derives most of its gross income.75 The figures which would establish
the state from which the corporation derives the most gross income
would be readily available, since modem corporate accounting
practices allocate income among the several states for the purposes
of state income tax and other business reasons. 76 Although it would
75. The original proposal of the Committee of Jurisdiction and Venue of the
Judicial Conference was that the citizenship of the corporation be determined by
reference to the state from which the corporation derived 50% of its gross income.
See note 29 supra. In rejecting the proposal, there was no suggestion that it was not
workable. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
76. In discussing the "50% gross income" test, the Committee of Jurisdiction and
Venue stated in their report to Congress:
Difficulties of proof on this score will be rare, and in the rare cases where the
line is close, the modem recordkeeping methods of most corporations, based as
they are upon allocations of income among the States for State income tax
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seem somewhat artificial to select any one state as the actual place of
operations of a large corporation whose business is scattered some-
what uniformly over a great number of states, there is at least a
strong possibility that the state from which the corporation derives
its most gross income will be the state in which it has the greatest
contact with the public.
However, most gross income should not be used as the sole cri-
terion in determining a corporation's actual place of operations in
all cases since, in some circumstances, other factors may more
accurately portray where most suits involving the corporation would
be likely to arise. For example, if a corporation has its production
facilities concentrated in one state, but carries on its sales or other
business activities nationwide, the state from which it derives its
most gross income may not be the state where most suits involving
it are likely to arise. An illustration of such a corporation would be a
tobacco company, which concentrates its production in North Caro-
lina, although its cigarettes are sold throughout the country. Such a
corporation is likely to derive most of its gross income from a heavily
populated state such as New York; however, most suits involving the
corporation are likely to arise in North Carolina where most of the
employees are concentrated and the physical assets of the corpora-
tion are located. In this situation it would not be necessary to use
most gross income as a controlling factor to solve the problem of
proof, since it is likely that the state where the physical assets of the
corporation are located-the actual place of operations -will be
easily ascertainable, and the problem of proof thus a minor one. To
the extent that this location cannot be easily ascertained, the most
gross income criterion would assume proportionately greater impor-
tance in determining the state of actual place of operations.
Conclusion
The most satisfactory method for determining the principal place
of business of a corporation is the actual place of operations test
since it focuses on the state where the corporation has its primary
contacts with the public and thus on the state where the greatest
number of suits involving the corporation will probably arise. By
declaring a corporation to be a citizen of that state, the greatest
decrease in the number of diversity cases can be achieved. Most
gross income would be desirable as the controlling factor in all
cases, except those in which this criterion clearly would not accu-
rately reflect the state where most suits involving the corporation
purposes, will provide ready means for establishing the basis of Federal jur-
isdiction.
1958 S. RP. 21.
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will arise. If this is done, the purpose of Congress will be effectuated
since the number of diversity cases will be substantially reduced, yet
litigants will not be discouraged from justifiably resorting to the
federal courts.

